Egypt arrests 18 over unauthorized mobile SIM registrations

Egyptian authorities said 18 people have been arrested in connection with the alleged registration of thousands of mobile lines using customers' personal data without their knowledge or consent. According to the Ministry of Interior announcement reported on 25 August 2026, six of those detained were customer-service employees of a telecommunications company and 12 were workers connected to intermediary companies and retail outlets across several governorates.

The arrests follow a separate regulatory action earlier in the month, when the National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (NTRA) referred Egypt's four mobile operators to the Public Prosecution over line-registration violations and imposed a package of urgent measures on how lines are sold, registered and activated.

No court has ruled on the allegations. Authorities said the suspects confessed during questioning and that legal proceedings are underway.

4,071 lines identified

Investigators identified 4,071 mobile lines, most of which had already been activated and were linked to electronic wallets, according to authorities. The seizures reported alongside the arrests included 32 mobile phones, a laptop, mobile-line purchase contracts, copies of customers' national ID cards said to have been used in the violations, and three flash drives containing customers' personal data.

The figure is small against a national base of well over 100 million mobile subscriptions, but the detail that matters is not the volume. It is that lines allegedly reached activation, and in many cases wallet linkage, while registered to people who say they never asked for them.

How the alleged registrations occurred

According to investigators, the alleged scheme did not depend on breaking into operator systems. It ran through the registration counter itself.

Authorities said customer-service employees at a telecommunications company registered lines using customers' personal details without their knowledge, and that those employees, together with staff at intermediary companies, supplied large quantities of SIM cards to retailers. Lines were routinely activated using photocopies of national ID cards, bypassing the requirement for the cardholder to be present or to sign a contract. Authorities said the practices were carried out over several years to inflate sales figures.

That distinction is important. Nothing in the official material describes operators being hacked or customer databases being breached. What is described is a control failure in the identity check that is supposed to sit between a photocopied ID and a working, wallet-linked mobile line.

The case began, according to authorities, with complaints from citizens who found lines registered in their names that they did not recognise.

The NTRA's regulatory response on 10 August

The regulatory track opened first. On 10 August 2026 the NTRA said it had referred Egypt's four mobile operators to the Public Prosecution after complaints from users about lines registered under their personal data without their knowledge or possession. The regulator said the referral followed inspection and verification procedures carried out over the preceding two days, during which evidence and documentation were compiled.

Alongside the referral, and after meetings with the four operators, the NTRA set out urgent measures intended to tighten the registration system and verify the identity of actual line holders. They include suspending bulk sales or activation of new lines through operator systems for corporations and entities, whether private or governmental.

The NTRA said operators that fail to comply face legal and administrative measures, which may include suspension of new line sales and activation, and referral of violations to the Public Prosecution under the law. The regulator said it is monitoring how operators implement the measures.

Re-verification and biometric checks

Two of the NTRA's measures reach directly into subscribers' hands.

The first is notification and re-contracting. The regulator required operators to send SMS notifications to all existing lines registered in their systems, instructing holders to visit operator branches to sign new contracts in the name of the actual user. Lines will be permanently cancelled if contract procedures are not completed within the specified deadline.

The second is biometrics. The NTRA said it is accelerating the rollout of biometric verification mechanisms through operators' electronic applications, to allow more secure identity checks and to let citizens act against any line registered in their name but not in their possession.

Together the two measures shift the burden of proof. Rather than treating an existing registration record as sufficient, they require the holder to be re-established, and give the person named on the record a route to challenge it.

What users can do

The practical step available to Egyptian mobile users is a check against their own national ID.

The My NTRA application includes a “My Numbers” (أرقامي) service that lets users see which mobile lines are registered using their national ID. The NTRA has been expanding the service, which also covers electronic wallets linked to a national ID and allows unfamiliar numbers to be reported.

If an unfamiliar line appears, guidance published by ISSA Egypt advises visiting the relevant operator's branch to request information and appropriate action, including cancellation where the line does not belong to the user. If the matter is not resolved, a complaint can be escalated to the NTRA on 155.

The same guidance suggests a simple habit when handing over a copy of a national ID to a trusted organisation: write the purpose, the organisation and the date on the copy. It does not guarantee protection, but it can reduce the risk of the copy being reused for another purpose.

Uptake of identity-verification checks has been substantial. Around five million people used the service in the week to 17 August, taking total users to roughly 12 million.

Why unauthorized SIM registration matters

A mobile number in Egypt is no longer only a way to make calls. It can sit behind one-time passwords, bank accounts and digital wallets, messaging and social accounts, email recovery and a widening set of services tied to a person's identity.

That is why a line registered to someone without their knowledge is an identity problem rather than a billing problem. As ISSA Egypt notes, a number registered using another person's identity information could potentially be used for fraud or impersonation. The detail that most of the 4,071 identified lines were already linked to electronic wallets places this case squarely in that territory.

It also explains the shape of the NTRA's response. Suspending bulk activations, forcing re-contracting in the actual user's name and accelerating biometric checks all target the same weak point: a registration process that could be completed with a photocopy rather than a person. Egypt's wider push toward remote identity verification, including the central bank's remote onboarding framework, depends on that weak point being closed.

For users, the immediate question is narrower and answerable today: which lines are registered under your national ID, and do you recognise all of them?